it the faculty of discursive thought, is conventionally regarded as "the man himself. ''5 Plotinus' intense interest in the owa~tq~6~Oov and the relation of its two components is revealed by the incident described in Porphyry's Life.
Plotinus, we are told (c. 1 3), once spent three days discussing with Porphyry the question: ntSg 71 ~tmX~l o~wo-rL T~ ~th~a~t. In the course of the discussion, a certain Thaumasius appeared, who, after listening to the conversation, remarked that he would much prefer to hear a general exposition of Plotinus' views rather than a series of questions and answers. To this Plotinus replied that without questions there would be no objections to resolve and therefore no material for an exposition of the type required. From what Plotinus eventually wrote on this topic, we can judge fairly accurately the tenor of the arguments put forward on this occasion and the kind of solutions offered to Porphyry's questions. But before we can even begin to consider in detail how Plotinus finally envisaged the ~otvt~'v~a of soul and body, we ought first to reflect briefly upon the causes originally responsible, in his view, for the initial embodiment of the soul.
It is misleading, Plotinus insists, to talk of the soul "descending" into the body. For descent implies a downward movement in space, which the soul never actually experiences (VI:4.I 6). This must be looked upon simply as a manner of speaking; the entry of the soul into the body cannot legitimately be described in spatial terms at all. However, in the spirit of Platonic myth, Plotinus continues to employ the metaphor of descent in his efforts to account for the departure of the soul from its original disembodied state. It is guilty, he suggests, of some error (~tctQT~) which consists in a desire to be independent of the Universal Soul (IV : 8.4), a voluntary inclination (IV : 8.5) toward the material world which results in its "fall" and the loss of its wings. Or to use a different metaphor, the soul beholds its own image in the mirror of matter, becomes enamored of it and plunges downward. 6 But though this entry into the material world can be regarded as voluntary in so far as it is the soul's own act, and "sinful" in so far as it involves separation from the perfection of the Whole, nevertheless, on a higher level, it is seen to be determined. For it is a universal law in the Plotinian system that the higher must give itself to the lower, and that soul must impart itself to body in order to realize its own implicit powers and to contribute to the perfection of the Cosmos. This means that the "sin" of the soul in entering the body proves to be, as it were, the "felix culpa" that is necessary to the divine economy. The incarnation of the soul is therefore no more the result of genuine sin than is the casting of a shadow. 7 5Though strictly speaking, this title should be reserved for the higher soul, the Ideal Man, which exists in the intelligible realm and is never associated with the body in any way. See A. H. Armstrong, "Man's Higher Self in Plotinus," Downside Review, No. 206 (1948 When we say that the soul "enters" the body, we imply that it is the soul that takes the initiative. It would be more accurate, however, Plotinus points out, to say that body approaches soul, as long as we do not take this to suggest any local movement (VI:4.16). Indeed, body has what Plotinus calls an "aptitude" (~nL~l~t6~qg; V1:4.15) for soul. This differs with different types of body; some are more suitable recipients than others; but that which is not capable of receiving soul in its entirety, shares in it as far as it can (VI : 4.15). But in what sense cart any organism, vegetable, animal or human be said to "possess" or "participate in" soul? How are soul and body connected? This is difficult to discover. For though body and soul are both ultimately derived from the same source, they are nevertheless completely different in character. Body is composite and therefore liable to dissolution; soul is the animating force that holds the bodily constituents together. Any theory that makes the soul itself corporeal ignores this distinction; and Plotinus takes great pains in this connection to refute the Stoic view that the soul is a special kind of body, the nve~ta in a particular state, (zt0~g ~ov) and the Epicurean theory that the soul is the product of a concourse of lifeless atoms (IV:7.18). To counter tbese materialistic doctrines he draws on various stock arguments which can be traced back, in many cases, to chapters II and V, Book I, DeA nima of Aristotle. We need not linger over these although they are relevant to the problem in hand, but will give some detailed attention to the objections brought by Plotinus against two other theories; firstly, the view set forth in the Phaedo (85e ft.) that the soul is an "attunement" (fiQ~ov~ct) of bodily elements; and secondly, the Aristotelian definition s of the soul as the ~vxek~Xetct or "fulfilment" of the body. Both of these theories attempt some sort of explanation of the body-soul connection.
The attunement theory, which Plotinus attributes to the Pythagoreans (IV : 7.84), makes the soul analogous to the fip~tov[ct produced upon the strings of the lyre, the nciffrl~ta that supervenes when the instrument is duly tuned. Plotinus points out, with an obvious allusion to the Phaedo, that this theory has already been proved untenable. But his own objections, curiously enough, are not based upon this dialogue, but, as Jaeger has shown, 9 upon the Eudemus of Aristotle. Certain arguments deriving from the De Anima of Aristotle are also, apparently, utilized for purposes of refutation? ~ The first point that Plotinus makes is that soul is prior to body, whereas the attunement theory presupposes the prior existence of the lyre. Second, the soul rules, guides, and often resists the body; this a mere attunement could not do, since it depends entirely upon the bodily constitution. In the third place, the soul is a substance in its own right, whereas an attunement is merely an accidental nd0-q~a. Fourth, a due blending of bodily elements would produce not soul but health. Fifth, there would have to be a plurality of souls in each individual, on the theory of an attunement, since each part of the body, being blended in different proportions, would require a distinct soul. Sixth, prior to the soul that supervenes upon the body after the manner of an attunement, there would have to be another soul to produce this condition, just as, in the case of a musical instrument, a musician is required to tune the strings: neither musical instruments nor human bodies are capable of putting themselves in tune. Finally, those who hold the attunement theory derive life and arrangement (xd~Lg) from what is lifeless and disordered; but this is manifestly impossible. For all these reasons, therefore, the soul cannot be related to the body as an attunement to its instrument.
The Aristotelian definition of the soul as the ~vreZ~Zeta of the body can be just as effectively disposed of. In the first place, Plotinus says (IV: 7.85), if the soul is related to the body as the shape (~to0q~fi) of a statue is related to its matter, the bronze, it follows that when the body is divided, the soul, its "form" will be divided with it; so that if any fragment of the body is severed from the whole, a portion of the soul will be severed too. In the next place, it is imperative that an ~vx~Xeta should be inseparable from that of which it is the fulfillment or realization; but if it is inseparable, the result will be that the soul will be incapable of withdrawing from the body in sleep, and this will make sleep an impossibility. Again, if the soul is an ~vx~XeLct, conflict between reason and bodily desire is ruled out completely, since the whole organism must have one uniform experience and there can be no discord between the body and the soul that informs it. Furthermore, on the ~vre~Xeta definition, there can be no pure thought, since thought is an activity that does not involve the body in any way. (And it is precisely for this reason, Plotinus notes, that the Peripatetics have to postulate another soul over and above the ~vxek~ZeLa to account for the purely intellectual functions of the soul.) There are further objections in similar vein. The final conclusion reached by Plotinus is that the soul does not depend for its existence upon serving as the "form" or realization of something else; it is an essence quite separate from any particular entity and it exists as soul pure and simple before it becomes the soul of such-and-such an individual.
Much of what Plotinus has to say about the body-soul problem seems purely negative. In what is perhaps his most important discussion of the topic, (IV:3.20) his main concern is to emphasise that however body and soul are related, they are not to be thought of as spatially connected. Soul is not in body as in a space, for the definition of space is that which contains body, and soul, not being corporeal, cannot be contained. The body is not, in any sense, the "vessel" (dyye~0v) of the soul. For if it were, and if the relation were a spatial one, the body itself would still remain devoid of soul, since container and contained are two entirely separate things. Of course, one might assume that soul could transmit something of itself to its container, but this would mean that the body's gain would the soul's loss. In any case, space, being the container of body, is not itself corporeal. Thus body which is corporeal, could scarcely be the -cbnog or "space" in which the soul is contained. Besides, if the soul were "in" the body in a spatial sense, the body would be in contact with the soul only at its surface and not throughout its entire mass; while yet another consequence of assuming a spatial connection would be that the soul qua contained by the body, would be carrying its own space about with it, which would be not only absurd, but actually impossible, according to the Peripatetic description of space as dt~xog. And even if we adopted the Stoic definition of space as the "interval" separating physical objects (btdoz~q/xct), a spatial relation between body and soul would still be impossible. For such an interval, Plotinus points out, would have to be a void. Body, however, is not a void; rather, it is itself in a void. So that even on Stoic premises, body cannot contain soul in a spatial sense.
Having established this point, Plotinus now tries to explain the presence of the soul in the body in non-spatial terms. He first considers the possibility of an analogy between the soul "in" the body and a color or shape in a substrate. But this suggestion is at once rejected on the grounds that color and shape are mere accidents of that which exhibits them, whereas the soul is not an accident of anything but an independent substance. Nor will Plotinus admit the possibility that the soul may be in the body as a part is "in" the whole; for the soul, he says, is not a part of the body. It would be equally absurd to say that it is in the body as a whole is "in" its parts. Nor can the soul be related to the body as immanent form to matter, for such a form is inseparable from matter and logically posterior to it. Besides, the soul is not itself a form but that which produces form; and even if we fall back upon the suggestion that it is analogous to a transcendent Platonic form and not an Aristotelian Elbog ~v a3~fi, we are still no nearer solving the problem of how this "form" is present to the body.
In spite of the many logical objections that should deter us from talking about the body-soul relation in spatial terms, we still persist in saying that the soul is "in" the body or that the body "has" a soul. The reason, Plotinus concludes, is that while the body is visible, the soul is invisible. Only from the behavior of the body can we observe the presence of the soul. But if we could see the soul, we would perceive that it is not merely coextensive with the body but "extends" far beyond the body. So that to be accurate, we ought BODY AND SOUL IN PLOTINUS 7 to say not that soul is in body but that body is in soul. Would it be a satisfactory solution of the problem to say that soul is related to body as the pilot to his ship? But this, Plotinus objects, would not really explain the mode of the soul's presence in the body (IV: 3.21). All it would indicate is that the soul and the body are potentially separable from one another, as is the case with the pilot and his vessel. In any case, the analogy is inadequate because the pilot is not omnipresent in the ship, whereas the soul penetrates to every point in the body. This difficulty might be avoided by comparing the soul not to the pilot himself but to his x~w I which operates through the helm, and so, in a sense, extends its power throughout the entire ship. But the pilot's x~Xv~l Plotinus points out, is in actual fact, external to the instrument it employs, whereas, if we are to apply this analogy to the soul, we shall have to regard it as immanent in the helm; and even if, accordingly, we think of the soul as immanent in the body, its instrument, the actual mode of its presence is still left unexplained.
Finally, after all his efforts, Plotinus is forced back upon a spatial metaphor to explain how soul is present to body. Their true relation is analogous, he says (IV:3.22), to that between light and air. Light is both present and not present to air (~at~ o~ ~rdQ~ax~), for though it completely penetrates the air, it is not blended with it at any point. While the air flows past, it remains immobile; and when the air passes beyond the region of illumination, it takes no light away with it. Therefore, just as the air is in the light and not vice-versa, the body is in the soul and not the soul in the body. But there is no objection to saying that the soul is "present to" the body, as long as we do not imply that any mixture has taken place between them. The soul is no more mixed with the body than light with air. Nor is it divided by contact with the body any more than light is divided by association with air. Of course, Plotinus is prepared to admit that the soul can be described as divisible in body in so far as it is present in every separate part of the body; but because it is present also at every point in its totality, it can also quite legitimately be designated indivisible (IV:2.1). The powers of the soul are various and different powers are associated with different organs, but every soul is present entire at every point. For if it were not omnipresent, it would not be a unity. If, like the body, it could be divided into distinct parts, each part would be cut off from the experiences of its fellows; thus the organism would never be affected as a whole by anything occurring in one particular part, and the body would be under the control, not of a single soul, but of a plurality of souls (IV:2.2). However, Plotinus adds, if the soul were completely indivisible, nothing would ever be ensoulled. Only when body approaches soul, can it participate in life; and such contact inevitably brings with it an element of apparent multiplicity. But this division, this ~QLa~6~, Plotinus reminds us,
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is not really an affection of the soul itself, but a nd0~l~ta of bodies (IV: 2.2).
By comparing the soul to light and the body to air, Plotinus makes clear both that the soul is indivisible and omnipresent in the body and that it is not confined within bodily limits. He is well aware, however, that he has still not found a satisfactory scientific explanation of the soul-body connection, and for this reason we find him still wrestling with this problem in the last of his psychological writings, Ennead I:l. The specific question which he is discussing in the relevant part of this treatise is to what extent body and soul share in the experiences of sensation, desire, emotion and thought. We are reminded at once of Aristotle's query in De Anima I : 1 (403a3 5) as to whether all the attributes of the soul are common to the living body, or if some are peculiar to the soul. It was a question that had also been discussed by Plutarch, who had concluded that in the case of the desires and emotions it was to the compound organism, to soul combined with body, that such experiences should be assigned. 11 This is precisely the position assumed by Plotinus. He insists, of course, that the higher soul which stands aloof from the body, remains quite unaffected by the experiences of the body-soul complex. But he believes that between the lower soul and the body which together make up the ~ov or owa~tq~brEQov, a genuine community of experience exists. The standard academic definition of Man as a "soul using a body ''12 will not however, allow for a sympathy between body and soul within the living organism. For it implies that body and soul are two quite unrelated things, the one corresponding to the workman's tool, the other to the workman himself. On this analogy, the soul will certainly have no share in the experiences of the body, for the workman does not actually feel the ~x~O41~t~x~ of his tool. And if this objection is countered by the argument that the soul will at least be aware of what is happening in the body, just as the workman knows how his tool is being affected, it is still impossible to see how the body could transmit its experiences to be shared by the soul. However, some sort of sympathy between the two might be established if one regarded them as mixed together. But the objection here is that as a result of any such mixture, the original characters of the two components would be modified; soul would become something less than soul and body something more than body; and, of the two, it would be body rather than soul, that would gain in power by assuming the faculty of sensation and the experiences that result from it. In any case, as Plotinus proceeds to point out, the metaphor of mixture is probably absurd, since soul and body may be, in fact, absolutely incongruous, so that to regard them as mixed together is as nonsensical as to say that a line XXln chapters IV and V of his discussion Whether Desire and Pain belong to the Soul or the Body, Plutarch gives evidence of a controversy on this topic between those who supported Strato's view that these states were the province of the soul alone, and those (perhaps Platonists) who attributed them to the body. See Br~hier's edition of Plotinus, Vol.IV, 39.
x~Plato, Alcibiades I : 129c; Phaedrus, 246b; Phaedo, 79c; Tim. 30b.
can be mixed with whiteness (I:1.4). Perhaps then as an alternative to the notion of a blend of soul and body, we might adopt the suggestion of Plato that the soul is interwoven (8ta~axe~oa) with the body. But this will not help either, if we wish to explain how soul and body can share common experiences. For the soul might penetrate right through the body and yet not share its states, in just the way that light can penetrate air and yet remain unaffected by it (I: 1.4). So far Plotinus has drawn a blank in his attempt to find some relation that will allow for sympathy between body and soul. But his next suggestion looks more promising. We may perhaps think of the soul, he says, as analogous to an immanent form inseparable from its matter, as for instance, the axe-shape in the axe. Now of course, it is not the axe-shape that performs the task of the axe and experiences the act of cutting, but the iron, the matter of the axe, on which the form has been imposed. So that on this analogy, it will be the body, not the soul, that is the subject of actions and states. But we should note that in the case of the axe, the effectiveness of the iron depends upon the fact that it has been modified by the axe-shape. So that if we apply this reasoning to the body-soul relation, we may conclude that it is not the body in isolation that is affected by desire, sensation and feeling, but rather, the living body, body modified, as it were, by soul. It is in fact, the ~(0ov or ovva~cp6r that is the subject of these experiences. Body by itself is inert and soul by itself impassible (III:6). But when body and soul combine to produce some distinct entity which is neither the one nor the other, then we can quite legitimately say that body and soul are in sympathy and are sharing common experiences and affections. Particular attention is given by Plotinus to the various ways in which soul and body co-operate and interact within the living organism. He lays special emphasis upon the mechanism of sense-perception which he regards as the connecting link between the body and the discursive reason. The power of sensation has been given to the soul, he says, in virtue of its association (xotmv~a, IV:4.24) with the body. It is the xotvbv ~Q,/ov (IV:3.26) of body and soul. That phase of the soul which transcends the body is quite incapable of perceiving anything in the sense world by direct means, because it lacks the necessary bodily organs of sight or hearing (IV: 3.19; 23; V: 1.10). However, it is made aware of events in the physical world through association with the sensitive faculty which transmits data to it (I: 19). In the Timaeus, Plato had actually assigned this discursive phase of the soul a definite physical location within the head. But Plotinus parts company with Plato here, since he does not regard the reasoning faculty as actually resident in the body. However, he continues to attach particular importance to the head since he believes that the brain is the central organ of certain psychic functions with which the discursive soul is intimately connected. It is from the brain, in his view (IV:3.23), that the nerves take their origin, and it is to the brain that the nerve-endings which occur all over the surface of the body, transmit what we should call tactual sensations and motor impulses. The more specialized sensations like sight or hearing, are not specifically associated by Plotinus with the brain and he seems to think of eyes and ears as independent organs of perception. But this does not mean that there is no co-ordination of the different types of sensation. Plotinus never tires of insisting upon the omnipresence of the soul in the body and its essential unity. Though different powers operate at different points, the soul, though apparently dispersed, is one. Thus all its functions must be inseparably connected, whatever their instruments may be and wherever situated (IV: 9.3). The various sense organs cannot all admit the same impressions, but all perceptions terminate in one centre where the data provided are sifted by the discursive reason (IV : 3.3).
As for the desires experienced by the body-soul compound, these, according to Plotinus, should be connected with the very lowest phase of the irrational soul, the vegetative element or q~t• (IV: 4.20) . This is present in all living things from plants to human beings, is responsible for their growth, nutrition and propagation, and is a reflection in the individual organism of the cosmic (p~atg, the lower aspect of the World Soul. Now though the term r215 is borrowed from Aristotle, it is from Plato that Plotinus has taken the idea that the desires belong to this particular faculty. In the Timaeus (77a, b), when discussing vegetable life, Plato assigns to plants the third form of soul which has to do with sensation, pleasant or painful, and the appetites. Plotinus is ready to accept this connection between the vegetative soul and the desires because he believes that the principle which causes birth and nourishment and growth must also desire these things. He agrees with Plato too in making the liver the special organ of desire, since it is in the liver that the veins and the blood that are the vehicles of the q~wt• have their point of origin (IV:3.23). Plotinus' account of the way in which desires are experienced is somewhat complicated (IV :4.20). Neither body alone nor soul alone can be the subject of desire, he insists, for body by itself cannot give rise to appetite, and soul in isolation from body has no interest in what is desirable or the reverse. Desire for such objects must clearly belong to something that is bodily but chooses to be more than mere body, that is, to a living organism, a body animated by a soul. Now is it this living body that initiates the desire? And is the desire transmitted thence to the desiring faculty of the soul? Or does the desiring faculty itself take the lead? Plotinus' reply is that it is hard to see how anyone could experience desire except through prior activity in the faculty of desire, but on the other hand, the desiring faculty cannot take the initiative unless the body is first in the appropriate condition (I : 1.5). In fact, Plotinus distinguishes three stages in the operation of desire within the body-soul complex. First there is a vague and unconscious nOo0vrt[a felt by the body. This is transferred to the qTuzt~6v where it becomes a fully conscious 'extffu~La; and finally, an image of this is conveyed by means of sensation, to the reasoning phase of the soul which alone has power to satisfy or to resist the desire (IV:4.20). That desires originate in this way, within the living body, is proved, Plotinus argues (IV:4.21), by the fact that they differ according to the condition of the body in respect of age or health. Furthermore, there are some desires that never get beyond the stage of unconscious xOoO~a~ of the body, simply because the opvzLx6v refuses to admit them. But when the needs of the body are conformable to this principle, like a human mother, it tries to satisfy the needs of the organism and to relieve its pain by identifying itself as far as possible with the sufferings of its offspring (IV : 4.20).
Closely bound up with the desires are pleasure and pain, also affections of the o'uva~tq~6zEOov. Body by itself could experience neither, since by itself it is devoid of life (IV:4.18); and soul in isolation is dxa0~;. Pleasure and pain are the direct result of their union. Because the two members of the compound are different in character, there is a constant tension as the organism is drawn in two opposite directions at once. When it is drawn toward the body it suffers pain; when directed toward the soul, it feels pleasure. Pain is thus defined as our perception of the body deprived of the soul's image, pleasure as the realization that this image is restored (IV : 4.19), in other words, that body and soul are again in harmonious relation to one another. When pain occurs, the xd~}o~ is felt directly by the body and perceived by sensation which then makes it known to the central sense on which all perceptions converge. It is of course, the living body that actually feels the pain. The soul, though aware of it, does not experience it directly. And this, Plotinus says, is proved by the fact that if the soul actually suffered the pain, being omnipresent in the body, it would not be able to localize the affection in one particular area, but would feel it at every point all over the body. A distinction must be made, in fact, between the actual pain and the perception of that pain, which is what the soul experiences. This perception of pain is a kind of knowledge (u and the phase of soul that acquires this awareness, if it is to report its findings correctly, must be dact041g. A messenger who is himself overwhelmed by emotion either fails to communicate his news at all or else transmits it inaccurately.
Finally we should consider the emotions experienced by the ovvct~tcp6zeOov. Only anger receives any detailed treatment in the Enneads, and this, following Plato, Plotinus connects with the passionate element of the soul, the 0a~oEtS~g (IV: 4.28). Like the desiring faculty, the 0a~t~ is also closely 12 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY connected with the cpvrtz6v, the principle of physiological life. But since anger also implies some subject capable of sensation and judgment, this association might not at first sight seem obvious or appropriate. The Stoics who say that anger arises from the judgment that some injury has been incurred, might well be correct in assigning to it a purely mental origin. However, Plotinus argues, anger usually has a physical rather than a mental source, since a predisposition to anger is a consequence of the organization of the body. People in whom the blood and the bile are particularly active are especially prone to anger, while those who are not of a bilious temperament (gZoX0 0 are less irascible. Animals get angry, not because they judge that they are victims of injury, but simply because of their bodily ~Q~otg; sick people are more prone to anger than those in full bodily health; the hungry are more irritable than the well-fed. All this goes to suggest (against the Stoic view) that the starting point of anger is not a mental perception, but rather a predisposition of the body. Anger actually arises, Plotinus says, in the blood around the heart which, being swift and subtle, is a suitable vehicle for passion. The blood and bile becoming active, impel the body to go through the motions of anger; sensation then follows; an impression (cpav~ao[a) is submitted to the reasoning faculty, and the source of the suffering is then attacked. Thus a mere disturbance in the body is transformed through the agency of the soul into an impulse (6Q~tfi) to action. That anger, like desire, is connected primarily with the vegetative phase of the soul and is of like nature, (6~too~otov) is indicated by the fact that people who are less inclined to bodily pleasures are also less irascible. The d:~ct0eta which they display is not due to the exercise of reason, but is simply a matter of physical temperament. It might be argued of course, that anger cannot be associated with the q~rr~• because plants, in which only this phase of soul is present, are not subject to anger. But this objection does not deter Plotinus. Plants do not feel anger, he explains, simply because there is no blood or bile in their constitution. They therefore lack the essential preconditions, the vehicles through which the ~-u~t~g operates. Of course, Plotinus does not deny that there can be cases where anger arises as the result of a mental judgment alone, and where a physical reaction follows and does not precede. But the vital point is that a feeling of anger can never be confined to the soul by itself. The body is always involved at some stage and its xQ~otg will invariably determine the intensity of the emotion in each individual case. Plotinus' interest in the oan,~tq~6xsQov as the meeting point of soul and body was undoubtedly inspired by the psychological studies of Aristotle. But it is likely too that it was also to some extent dictated by an interest in medical science. We know from Porphyry 18 that Plotinus numbered several laxQm6L among his close associates, Paulinus of Scythopolis, Zethos, an Arab, and lSLife of fflotinus, c.7.
Eustochius of Alexandria, who attended Plotinus during his last years and became an ardent disciple. Perhaps it was through such professional medical practitioners as these that Plotinus became familiar with the psychological theories of the great physician Galen, whose influence can be detected at several points in his examination of the soul-body problem, particularly in his discussion of the nerves and the brain, 14 and in his emphasis on the importance of bodily "temperament." Plotinus' strange theory of the ~v~6~ "around the soul" may also have come from some medical source. According to Inge, ~5 Plotinus envisaged this nvE~ as the connecting link between body and soul. Let us consider what evidence there is to support this view. In Ennead II 2.2., Plotinus introduces the nv~ta in a discussion of the circular motion of the Cosmos. Why, he asks, since the Cosmic Soul revolves around God, do not human souls and bodies also revolve? The reason given is that while bodies are characterized by movement in a straight line, the human soul is hampered in its circling motion by the earth that clogs it. But perhaps, Plotinus adds, the :w~a around the soul revolves. In IV : 4.26, there is a clue as to what Plotinus means by this z~ve~a. Here he describes it as 8taq~av~g • ~a~tx6~t~vov ~aQ~ r • and represents it as the container of the vegetative principle. Now presumably this zcv~ta can be equated with the celestial body which, in IV:3.15, souls are said to assume when they first emerge from the intelligible world, and by means of which they proceed into "more earthy bodies." Already in the same treatise (c. 9), Plotinus has described the soul as born into an earthy body ~• ~d~ct~og flEa,roy ~ x~0~vov. Perhaps we have in these texts a clue to the origin of Porphyry's ~ theory of a celestial ~v~fiB~x which the soul retains even after death. In the same way we can probably trace to another Plotinian passage (III:6.5.) the definition of the :~va~a put forward by ProclusY He calls it the ~X~l~a or "vehicle" of the soul. This could be a direct interpretation of Plotinus' remark that the soul can only be separated from the body when that which contains it (~6 ~v ~) is tenuous (toXv6v) and not swollen from gluttony or excess, so that the soul can ride peacefully upon it (cbg ~x 'a~ofi 6X~oOa~ ~lovXfi; III: 6.5). As Inge observes, this xw~Ba probably has little philosophical importance in Plotinus' system, but at least it seems to be an attempt to bridge the gap between body and soul. We realize of course, that the notion of a kinship between the human soul and the celestial regions goes back to Plato's Timaeus where the Demiurge is represented as "sowing" each soul into a star at its first birth (41e). But it atso seems possible that the notion of a celestial ~v~z~ in Plotinus may owe x~See Br6hier's edition, VoI.IV, 90, n.1, and F. Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves," Museum Helveticum, Vol. 18, l:aac. 4 (1961), 169-197 . something to Aristotle too. In his De Generatione dnimalium, we remember, Aristotle establishes an analogy between the vital heat or ovt~cpv~ov ~v~a in animals and the ether, "the elements of the stars" (II:3, 737al). Now one of the main functions of this av~tq~ov nve~tct is to explain locomotion and sensation in animals. Could this be the role Plotinus intends for his nv~ux in the Enneads and has the Aristotelian connection of the nv~bta with the ether, which is characterised by circular motion, suggested to him an equation of the nv~tct "round the soul" with the star-bodies of the Timaeus? Further research into this question might lead to interesting results. The final theme of this discussion concerns the fate of the irrational aspects of the soul after the body-soul association has been terminated by death. Does the irrational soul perish with the body? Plotinus answers this question in the negative. When the body is discarded, he says, "all powers merge into one soul" (IV: 9.3). Thus, desire, feeling and the power of sensation lose their specific character when their raison d'etre has gone, and like the discursive faculty, become absorbed into the higher phase of the soul that has always held itself aloof from the body. Even the r215 the source of physical life, survives bodily death. For a brief time it may actually linger within the body after death has occurred; this is evident from the fact that hair and nails may continue to grow upon a corpse (IV:4.29). But eventually, it abandons all connection with that particular organism and returns to its source in the World Soul, only to re-emerge as the animating force in some other individual. In this way life can arise again even in the carcass of a dead animal. The soul that originally inhabited the beast's body is of course, no longer present, since that particular body has long since ceased to be receptive of the life force. But the decayed matter in time becomes suitable material for some other form of life, and is thus, once more, ensoulled, because, as Plotinus says, "Soul is nowhere lacking, though a suitable recipient may be" (IV: 3.8). Although Plotinus does not use the term in this context, we might almost be justified in talking of the reincarnation of the ~t• But such a rebirth would, of course, have to be distinguished from the ~zeva0~td~c0ou; that is the fate of individual souls who have failed during life in their moral duty of purifying themselves from the body. In the case of such souls, irrational elements are not laid aside even after death. If they have succeeded during life in preserving their specifically human character, they are born again into human bodies. But those who have lived on the level of sensation alone take animal forms, while those who have lived stupid and unreflective lives are reincarnated as plants (III:4.2). In each case, the faculty most fully developed during one life will determine the type of body that the soul will assume in the next. However, the final goal for which the soul must strive, is to be free of the body altogether; the true awakening of the soul is not with the body but from the body (III:6.6). The soul that finally achieves eman-
